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First Amendment Inversions
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J.
2001).
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,' the Supreme Court held that a
municipal transportation company could exclude political expression from
its buses, even as it allowed commercial vendors to advertise. The Court
reasoned that the transportation system was a nonpublic forum-an
institution run by the government for specific purposes-and that the
government could exclude political speech that interfered with those
purposes. By permitting government to privilege commercial speech over
political expression, Lehman's nonpublic forum doctrine allows for the
reversal of the usual First Amendment hierarchy. Later cases provided
doctrinal props to ensure the fairness of such inverted2 structures: In a
nonpublic forum, the government can discriminate on the basis of subject
matter but not on the basis of viewpoint Additionally, any restrictions on
speech have to be reasonable in light of the forum's purpose These criteria
ensure that the government, even in a nonpublic forum, cannot "suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."5
1. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
2. Courts have used the metaphor of "inversion" to describe laws that privilege commercial
speech over political expression. See, e.g., Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513
(1981) (" [Cases have] consistently accorded noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection
than commercial speech. San Diego effectively inverts this judgment, by affording a greater
degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial speech.").
3. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)
("Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so
long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are
viewpoint neutral.").
4. Id.
5. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (citing U.S.
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 131 (1981)).
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Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly6 uses the nonpublic forum
doctrine to invert another, more fundamental, First Amendment hierarchy.
Members of the Tenafly Jewish community sought to construct an eruv
7
around the town's perimeter. The mayor and town council opposed the
eruv, citing a facially neutral ordinance that prohibited placing material on
the town's utility poles.8 As plaintiffs in the district court, supporters of the
eruv argued that it constituted symbolic speech and was protected under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. The district court agreed with
the plaintiffs' characterization of the eruv as symbolic speech but found that
the ordinance, as applied to the nonpublic forum where the eruv was to be
built, placed valid restrictions on such expression. When the plaintiffs
pointed out that the town allowed other religious structures in the nonpublic
forum, the court denied that those structures constituted speech,9 describing
some as only "decorations" '0 and others as serving merely "utilitarian
function[s]." "
Tenafly uses the nonpublic forum to invert the First Amendment in a
novel way-privileging conduct even as it belittles speech. The Tenafly
plaintiffs, reaching for the safeguards of the First Amendment, claimed that
the eruv constituted speech. But the logic of the nonpublic forum turned
6. 155 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.N.J. 2001).
7. Briefly, Orthodox Jewish law prohibits transporting objects through public areas (reshut
harabim) on the Sabbath, but allows for the circumvention of that prohibition in semipublic areas
(karmelit) through the eruv. An eruv is a "ceremonial demarcation of an area," id at 142, which,
by Jewish law, converts a semipublic domain into a semiprivate domain, permitting Orthodox
Jews to carry within that area on the Sabbath. See generally MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH,
HILKI-OT SHABBAT 14:11; MAIMONIDES, MISHNAH TORAH, HILKHOT ERUVIN 1:1-3. In Tenafly,
the contested portion of the eruv took the form of black plastic strips on utility poles. Tenafly, 155
F. Supp. 2d at 149. Pictures of the eruv are provided at the end of the court's opinion. Id. at 192-
93 apps. A-B. The same court had previously held that a town did not violate the Establishment
Clause if it erected an eruv. ACLU v. City of Long Branch, 670 F. Supp. 1293 (D.N.J. 1987).
8. Tenafly Ordinance 691 provides, in relevant part, that "[n]o person shall place any sign or
advertisement, or other matter upon any pole, tree, curbstone, sidewalk or elsewhere, in any public
street or public place, excepting such as may be authorized by this or any other ordinance of the
Borough." Tenafly, N.J., Ordinance 691, art. VII(7) (Oct. 26, 1954), quoted in Tenafly, 155 F.
Supp. 2d at 176.
9. The court also provided alternative justifications for its decision, with which I do not take
issue here. Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
10. Id. at 170. Every year holiday displays were placed on Tenafly's utility poles. Each
display consisted of a wreath, a garland, a light fixture, and seasonal holiday lights. The court
decided that these did not constitute speech, writing: "[M]indful that if it looks like a duck, walks
like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck-not a platypus, the Court finds that the
decorations are what they are: decorations. They do not constitute symbolic speech as that term is
understood in a constitutional sense." Id. at 177 (internal quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. at 178. The Tenafly right-of-way contained several church directional signs, some of
which contained religious symbols. Id. at 169. The court asserted that the signs
serve the utilitarian function of providing traffic directions. That the signs contain
Christian symbohsm is, if at all relevant, marginal to the purpose of the signs, since no
one has questioned their primarily directional purpose....
Given the purely functional nature of the signs, similar to the holiday displays the
Court finds that the church directional signs are of a different character than the [eruv].
Id. at 178.
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this argument against itself. The court allowed the town to discriminate
against the eruv specifically because, being speech, it differed from the
permitted structures.
Many courts share Tenafly's intuitive reliance on the speech/conduct
dichotomy. Lehman, for example, can be seen as scrutinizing distinctions
between political and commercial advertising (speech) but not distinctions
between political advertising and walking down the aisle of a bus (not
speech).12 I argue that this intuition is incorrect: The relevant difference
between advertising and walking is not that one is speech and the other
conduct; and, in any case, the devices of Lehman's progeny-viewpoint
neutrality and reasonableness-cannot be coherently applied if one makes
such a distinction. I conclude that, in the nonpublic forum, courts should
eschew the vagaries of the speech/conduct distinction.
I
After Lehman, the Supreme Court required that any restrictions on
expression in a nonpublic forum be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.
3 But
Tenafly did not compare the viewpoints of the eruv and the decorations and
did not apply the reasonableness test. 4 This Part accounts for those
omissions, demonstrating why they are consistent with the logic of the
speech/conduct inversion. I then contend that, despite this internal
coherence, the Tenafly court should not have used the speech/conduct
dichotomy simply to skip those tests.
Consider how Lehman tested for viewpoint neutrality and
reasonableness. There, the fact that the expression took place in a nonpublic
forum allowed the government to reverse the usual First Amendment
priorities-regulating political expression while leaving commercial speech
alone. Both categories of speech, however, remained within the broader
12. In Lehman, the Court sanctioned a prohibition on political advertisements on buses.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). Presumably, paying riders were still
allowed to engage in the conduct of walking down the aisle of the bus. The Supreme Court did not
explain why it compared political advertising to commercial advertising but did not compare it to
walking. However, a plausible reading of the difference between these two types of behavior-
commercial advertising and walking-is that the former is speech and the latter is conduct. See
also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 733 (1990) (comparing solicitation on a
government-owned sidewalk, which was prohibited, to "other forms of speech" that were
permitted on that property, but not to walking a dog, riding a bicycle, or selling balloons on the
property).
13. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
14. Tenafly did mention one factor that could have entered into such a "reasonableness"
analysis. Specifically, the court mentioned that the eruv would be permanent, not temporary.
Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 177. However, the court only brought this up as part of an alternative
basis for its decision, after assuming arguendo that perhaps "the holiday displays do have some de
minimis expressive value." Id The court never mentioned any reason why it was reasonable to
discriminate between the eruv and the permanent directional signs.
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constitutional ambit of protected expression. As a result, to justify
regulation, the government still had to show that it had not chosen among
different viewpoints. It also had to show that, in light of the property's
purpose, the distinction between the two kinds of speech was reasonable. 5
But Tenafly did not have two categories to compare. By defining all
permissible behavior as "nonspeech," the court precluded analysis of that
behavior under the nonpublic forum doctrine. For example, by classifying
the decorations as conduct, the court effectively denied that they expressed
any message at all. From this perspective, it was logically impossible for
Tenafly to have discriminated between different viewpoints. 6 Similarly, the
court saw no distinction that it should have examined for reasonableness.
Once deaf to the decorations' expression, the court was also blind to any
discrimination between different kinds of speech. In the end, what was left
to compare with the eruv to assess its exclusion? The only regulatory
differences were between speech and nonspeech, and nonspeech is, by
designation, invisible to First Amendment analysis.
Tenafly shows why the principles of viewpoint neutrality and
reasonableness cannot be applied to the speech/conduct inversion. Those
standards do not bar the regulation of speech, but just require that any
restrictions be applied across the entire domain of speech in a reasonable,
viewpoint-neutral way. Thus, by excluding the decorations and signs from
the domain of speech, Tenafly's framework vitiates both the reasonableness
and viewpoint-neutrality analyses. As the Supreme Court has insisted,
however, those criteria are necessary to ensure the fairness of regulations in
the nonpublic forum. Courts should not simply skip them, as Tenafly did,
by applying formal categorizations.
15. Cf Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) ("The
touchstone for evaluating these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose
which the forum at issue serves."). In describing the "reasonableness" test, I sometimes refer to
reasonable restrictions and sometimes to reasonable distinctions. The term restriction assumes
that the test incorporates requirements analogous to due process fairness: Any restriction must be
reasonable in and of itself. The term distinction assumes that the test incorporates requirements
analogous to equal protection fairness: Any restriction must be fair when compared to restrictions
on similar behavior. See id. at 55 ("When speakers and subjects are similarly situated, the State
may not pick and choose.").
16. The court simply dismissed the plaintiff's claims of viewpoint discrimination, finding no
evidence that Tenafly "tolerated some private expression in the right-of-way but denied to
Plaintiffs comparable access on the basis of their specific ... perspective. In fact, the weight of
the evidence points to the fact that as a general rule, Tenafly does not tolerate any private, non-
commercial expression in its right-of-way." Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 179. The court also
asserted, "[T~here is no evidence that the Borough has tolerated some expressive uses of the poles
while prohibiting other such uses . i..." Id. The court pointed to sprinklers and transmitters as
other examples of nonexpressive behavior that communicated no viewpoint. Id.
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II
Aside from permitting Tenafly to shirk its doctrinal responsibilities, the
speech/conduct distinction has normative faults. Outside the nonpublic
forum, that dichotomy is grounded in constitutional text and jurisprudence.
But inside the nonpublic forum, the dichotomy misdirects the moral thrust
of the First Amendment. Tenafly only permitted the town to discriminate
against the eruv, and in favor of the decorations, because it saw one as
expression and the other as conduct. That cannot be correct. It is the reverse
of the usual First Amendment rule, which protects behavior simply because
it is expression. The First Amendment exists to provide special protection
to speech. Even when the nonpublic forum allows restrictions on
expression, the mere category of speech should never justify increased
regulation.
Moreover, inside the nonpublic forum, the speech/conduct dichotomy
undermines First Amendment protection for a minority's behavior.
7 Note
how, outside the nonpublic forum, the dichotomy results in more protection
for a minority's activities. A majority may see a minority's peculiar
behavior as an intentional expression of that minority's culture. Moreover,
since that conduct can easily be associated with a particular group, it may
be easier for a member of the majority to understand that a message is being
communicated." For example, while courts have generally been
unreceptive to the argument that students have a First Amendment right to
wear long hair, they have been more sympathetic to that claim when Native
Americans have argued that their specific hairstyles have expressive
content.19 Similarly, it may be easier to see the expressive intentions and
impact of the Ku Klux Klan's costume than of more familiar dress.
2"
17. For the argument that the purpose of constitutional jurisprudence should be to protect
minorities, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST 78-80 (1980). In the context of the
First Amendment, this means that courts should shield minority expression from majoritarian
censorship. Id. at 106 ("Courts must police inhibitions on expression... because we cannot trust
elected officials to do so: ins have a way of wanting to make sure that the outs stay out." ).
18. These two criteria-intentional expression and the potential understanding of the
audience-are the standards used to determine whether behavior should be categorized as speech
or conduct. See Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). The Spence test asks
whether an "intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it." Id.
19. Compare Ala. & Coushatta Tribes v. Trs. of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1333-34 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (agreeing with the plaintiffs that wearing long hair "is an
expressive or communicative activity to a Native American"), with King v. Saddleback Junior
Coll. Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971) (finding that wearing long hair was not
constitutionally protected because the plaintiffs "were not purporting to say anything. [One
plaintiff] ... flatly stated that his hair style was not a badge or a symbol of any group. On the
contrary, he said that he was 'a minority of one"'). See also New Rider v. Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S.
1097, 1099 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Petitioners were not
wearing their hair in a desired style simply because it was the fashionable or accepted style, or
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Although Tenafly is unclear as to exactly why the court regarded the
eruv as symbolic speech, the eruv's explicit identification with a
recognizable group seemed to play a large role."' Thus, the court considered
the Jewish eruv to be symbolic speech even as it regarded similar structures
as mere conduct. The eruv seemed to communicate the unusual message of
a minority culture; the decorations and signs simply composed part of the
regular cultural background.
Outside the nonpublic forum, this assessment would have given the
eruv more protection than the decorations. But the nonpublic forum allows
the government to suspend the usual First Amendment hierarchy,
minimizing the protection granted to minority behavior. As any
measurement of communication is inevitably calibrated to the prevailing
cultural standard,"2 such inversions generate a bias against minority speech.
Government will always hear the distinct tones of minority expression
above the cultural cacophony, and may stifle those sounds. At the same
time, it will remain deaf to the pervasive hum of majority behavior.
Tenafly's doctrinal framework, rather than exposing this bias, obscures it
beneath the formalisms of the speech/conduct dichotomy.
because they somehow felt the need to register an inchoate discontent . They were in fact
attempting to broadcast a clear and specific message to their fellow students and others--their
pride in being Indian."). But see Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189, 1193 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding
that an Indian student's long hair was not "symbolic speech" under the First Amendment).
20. Compare Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp. 2d
583, 587 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (finding the KKK costume to be protected speech because "white
hoods worn by Plaintiffs' members would likely be understood by onlookers as symbolic of the
Klan's identity"), and Hernandez v. Superintendent, Fredericksburg-Rappahannock Joint Sec.
Ctr., 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (E.D. Va. 1992) (stating that although wearing a mask was not
protected speech, the KKK robes and hoods were expression because they "symbolized the
Klan's beliefs and were likely to be so understood by those who viewed them"), with Bivens v.
Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 899 F. Supp. 556, 561 (D.N.M. 1995) (finding that wearing sagging
pants was not protected speech because it was not "necessarily associated with a single racial or
cultural group"), and Olesen v. Bd. of Educ., 676 F. Supp. 820, 822 (N.D. I11. 1987) (holding that
wearing an earring was not constitutionally protected because it only expressed a student's
"individuality").
21. The court's factual account is replete with statements identifying the symbolism of the
eruv with Orthodox Jews. See Tenafly, 155 F. Supp. 2d at 145-71. This strongly contrasts with the
court's endorsement of the town's broad and ecumenical description of the holiday displays:
"[Their] purpose is to promote a shopping atmosphere in downtown during the holiday season.
They remain in place for approximately six weeks. They are intended to be nondenominational
and are certainly nonreligious. They are intended to convey a wintry holiday theme and nothing
else." Id. at 176-77.
22. Professor Tribe has asserted that "[t]he very notion of speech is.. . incomprehensible
outside a cultural and social framework." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 831 (2d ed. 1988). The Supreme Court, in distinguishing between speech and conduct,
explicitly refers to the cultural context of communication. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 408-11.
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III
The lesson of Tenafly is that doctrinal structures-even fundamental,
intuitive ones-should not always be taken seriously. In the nonpublic
forum, courts should ignore the ambiguous categories of speech and
conduct. In comparing two kinds of behavior in the nonpublic forum, it is
simply not relevant whether one activity is, in comparison, more
expressive. Outside the nonpublic forum, the speech/conduct dichotomy
highlights the strong protection that the First Amendment extends to
speech. But inside the nonpublic forum, the government may regulate both
speech and conduct. There, drawing the same distinction ignores, and even
distracts courts from considering, the relevant standard: ensuring
compatibility with the purposes of the nonpublic forum.
23
The only relevant question in comparing two activities is whether one is
more disruptive. The court should have elaborated on specific arguments
for the compatibility of one kind of behavior over the other, without hiding
those reasons behind the speech/conduct categorization. If the town were to
argue that the eruv visibly interfered with the right-of-way, then it should
have to explain why, in comparison, the decorations did not. If the town
were to argue that the eruv was controversial or offensive, it should have to
articulate why the decorations and signs were not. Expressiveness may be a
useful proxy for these kinds of disruptiveness, but it is a proxy that can hide
discrimination behind a formal label. Tenafly's unexpressed grounds for
deciding that the eruv's expression was disruptive were easily buried under
the formalism of the speech/conduct distinction. Those reasons should have
been unearthed, and Tenafly should have applied the criteria of viewpoint
neutrality and reasonableness to those more specific reasons to ensure they
were not discriminatory.
Tenafly's focus on the speech/conduct dichotomy is a hallmark of
classic First Amendment jurisprudence. But the generalities of the
speech/conduct dichotomy are not always an appropriate place to draw the
line for First Amendment protection. The Constitution should prompt us to
ask whether that hallmark itself might sometimes be a front for
discrimination. That inquiry demands that the First Amendment move
beyond a focus on speech to a more general emphasis on equality.
-Eli Greenbaum
23. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 804 (1985) (stating
that the government could limit expression "[i]n cases where the principal function of the
property would be disrupted by expressive activity"); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 186 (1998) (stating that public forum doctrine allows the government to "ensure
that the facilities which it creates are used in a way that is compatible with their basic purpose").
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